This paper proposes two value-based standards for setting the initial margin requirements on futures positions. Our approach is based on the fact that the distributions of the payoffs to futures traders and the potential losses to the futures clearinghouse can be described in terms of the payoffs to barrier options with appropriately defined strike prices and knockout boundaries. Based on this observation, we argue that initial margin requirements are adequate if the initial margin that must be posted is either (1) equal to the ex ante value of the payoffs to the futures position or (2) sufficient to reduce the value of the potential losses absorbed by the futures clearinghouse to zero.
Introduction
Businesses with undiversified positions in commodities and financial securities can use futures markets to transfer all or a part of the underlying risk to either speculators or businesses having offsetting exposures. This transfer of risk is facilitated by the margining system, which must provide the liquidity supporting the open interest required for risk management while simultaneously assuring accountability for any losses that might be sustained. Thus, the futures exchanges that set these margin requirements face a trade-off between loss prevention and the transactional efficiency of the market. If the required margin is set too high, the added costs associated with higher margins may impede trading, reducing market depth and liquidity. If margins are inadequate to limit the speculative positions taken by undercapitalized traders, the futures clearinghouse may suffer excessive losses, reducing the profits shared by members of the exchange and increasing the costs of trading. Thus, margin policy is of concern not only to regulators, but also to traders and members of the futures exchange.
The current margining system requires that open futures positions be marked-to-market, with gains and losses transferred to or from a trader's margin account at the end of each day's trading.
Whenever a trader's cumulative losses are sufficient to bring the margin balance below a prespecified level of maintenance margin, the futures exchange will liquidate the position unless funds sufficient to restore the balance of the futures account to the initial margin requirement are deposited immediately. Since the maintenance level is generally well below the initial margin requirement, the remaining margin may become small in relation to potential losses. In the event that these losses exceed the remaining margin deposit, there is a possibility that a trader will be forced to default on the contract. 1 This problem is of particular concern in volatile markets.
The possibility that a futures position may ultimately lead to default, along with the loss of the initial margin deposit, suggests that the initial margin requirement may be treated as a premium collected by the futures clearinghouse in exchange for an option that will be terminated if the futures price reaches a contractual barrier determined by the maintenance margin requirement. For example, the cash flows from a long position are similar to those for a down-and-out call option. If the futures price does not fall below the knockout barrier, the payoff at the delivery date will equal the terminal futures price less a strike price determined by the difference between the initial futures price and the initial margin. If the futures price falls below the knockout barrier, where the equity in the futures account is less than the required maintenance margin, the contract will be terminated and the trader may either default or else receive a rebate equal to the remaining equity in the account. Similarly, a short futures position can be viewed as an up-and-out put option.
The similarity of the payoffs from long and short futures positions to the corresponding payoffs for down-and-out calls and up-and-out puts provides a natural framework for balancing loss prevention with the need to maintain a liquid futures market. By setting the initial margin requirement equal to the value of the option-like payoffs from a margined futures position, the futures exchange can eliminate any ex ante incentive for default prone traders to establish undercapitalized positions. Although this approach forces creditworthy traders to post margins that include a "default premium" equal to the expected value of the losses that might be shirked by default prone traders, this disadvantage is offset by the reduction in the costs of default that would otherwise be passed on in the form of higher transaction fees to all parties trading on the exchange.
Previous research on setting margin requirements has been concerned primarily with the probability that short-term fluctuations in futures prices will result in the failure of traders to meet organization. For example, the futures commission merchant (FCM) who initially handles the trade acts as a guarantor of the contract in the event of a customer default. In the event that FCM fails to meet this obligation, the clearing firm that clears the trade for the FCM must act as the guarantor for the contract. their contractual obligations. Tomek (1985) , Edwards and Neftci (1988), and Warshawsky (1989) examine the adequacy of margin requirements based on the time series properties of futures prices.
More closely related to the approach taken here are papers by Figlewski (1984) , Gay, Kolb, and Hunter (1988) , Craine (1993 ), and Longin (1994a and 1994b . For example, Figlewski argues that maintenance margins should be set so that the probability of default, determined from the distribution of first passage times to the default boundary, is less than an arbitrary target level.
Following a related approach, Longin uses extreme value theory to develop a model that provides the required margin for a given probability that the initial margin will be exhausted.
In contrast to most previous research, the options-based approach to setting margin requirements developed here avoids the need to arbitrarily specify an acceptable probability of default. Further, since we explicitly model the stochastic properties of futures market volatility, our estimates of required margins provide a more accurate benchmark for the margins necessary to absorb the financial stress caused by increases in volatility. Our model is related to the approach suggested by Craine, which is based on the observation that a trader with a long futures position has the option to put the contract back to the clearinghouse. However, whereas Craine assumes that the option to default expires at the end of one day when the futures contract is resettled, we explicitly value the entire sequence of embedded options attributable to the fact that a trader can choose to default on any day prior to the delivery date. We use our model to examine the adequacy of the margin requirements for the crude oil futures contract traded on the New York Mercantile Exchange (NYMEX). This contract is of interest for several reasons. First, the sample period that we examine includes a large number of changes in margin requirements during a relatively short time period. This provides a unique opportunity to evaluate the dynamic performance of our model relative to the margin requirements set by the NYMEX. Further, the extreme volatility of the underlying spot market during the period following the invasion of Kuwait by Iraq allows us to examine the performance of the model during a period of extreme financial stress. Finally, the complex sequence of margin deposits required to trade crude oil futures illustrates the flexibility of the approach used to implement the model.
The equivalence between the cash flows from margined futures positions and the respective cash flows from down-and-out call options and up-and-out put options is discussed in Section 2.
In Section 3, we propose two alternative standards for the adequacy of initial margin requirements based on the valuation of these option-like payoffs. Our assumptions concerning the dynamics of crude oil futures prices and the underlying stochastic volatility of the market are described in Section 4. Parameter estimates for the stochastic process for the volatility of the futures market are reported in Section 5. In Section 6, we compare the required margins estimated using our model with the actual margins set by NYMEX. We find that crude oil futures were systematically "overmargined" during both the periods prior and subsequent to the invasion of Kuwait. However, during the post-invasion period we find a number of instances where the initial margins set by NYMEX appear to be inadequate. The impact of initial margin requirements on trading activity in the crude oil futures market is examined in Section 7. Section 8 concludes the paper.
Characterizing Margined Futures Positions
The Commodity Exchange Act requires that futures exchanges set appropriate margin requirements and make timely adjustments in these requirements as warranted by changing market conditions. For the crude oil futures contract traded on the NYMEX, the exchange's Margin Steering Committee sets margin requirements based on their assessment of historic and projected future volatility, price levels, and market conditions. These margin requirements establish the minimum margins required to initiate both long and short futures positions. The actual margins required by futures commission merchants may also depend on characteristics of individual customers such as the number of accounts or deposits, prior performance history, and net worth.
In addition to a deposit of initial margin when a futures position is initiated, a futures exchange may require additional margin deposits during the life of the contract. For example, the NYMEX increases the required margin on energy futures contracts during the month prior to delivery by imposing spot month assessments of $1,000 on the first day of trading in the spot month contract and $2,000 on the fifth business day prior to the last day of regular trading. 2 While the timing of these assessments complicates the implementation of the option-based approach to setting margins described below, our approach is sufficiently flexible to determine the margins required under a wide range of policies with respect to the imposition of margin requirements.
Long Positions
Whenever a long futures position is initiated, the buyer must deposit initial margin of M dollars per unit of the commodity underlying the futures contract. Since the positions of traders who are not clearing members of the exchange are marked-to-market at the end of each day's trading, the equity in the futures account may either increase or decrease over the life of the contract. 3 In the event that the equity in the futures account falls below the required level of maintenance margin, αM , the trader must deposit cash or securities sufficient to restore the equity in the account to M, the initial margin requirement. Given the initial margin deposit and the maintenance margin requirement, a trader with a long position will receive a margin call if the futures price falls to
2 Trading in the crude oil futures contract ends on the third business day prior to the 25th of the month preceding the delivery month. 3 The futures exchange has the authority to impose more frequent resettlement requirements if the futures market becomes particularly volatile.
where 0 F denotes the initial futures price and α (0 < α < 1) represents the percentage of the initial margin necessary to meet the maintenance margin requirement.
If the trader does not restore the equity in the futures account to M, the position will be closed out by the exchange. Assuming that the equity in the account is sufficient to cover the loss that has occurred since the last resettlement date, the residual equity in the account,
will be returned to the trader. This outcome is illustrated by the time series of futures prices labeled (A) in Figure 1 . Although the maintenance margin requirement is satisfied at the close of trading on day t-1, the futures price falls below
at the end of day t. If the equity in the account is not restored to M, the exchange will close out the position, leaving the trader with a rebate equal to the remaining equity in the account.
When the cumulative losses on the futures position exceed the initial margin requirement, t R is less than zero. This outcome is depicted by path (B) in Figure 1 . Since the required maintenance margin must be on deposit at the beginning of each trading session, the price decline on day t must exceed αM. We assume that whenever t R is less than zero the trader defaults, forcing the clearinghouse to absorb a loss of
Although standard resettlement procedures do not require a margin call if the futures price falls
during a trading session, the futures price must exceed this trigger point when the contract is resettled at the end of each day's trading. For example, path (C) in Figure 1 illustrates the case where the futures price falls below the maintenance margin level during day t+1 but recovers by the end of the day. 4 Since
, a margin call does not occur.
Whenever a long position is closed out at a futures price above the level that triggers a margin call, the trader receives a cash settlement equal to,
Although the payoff given by (3) is similar to the payoff received when a the position must be closed out following a margin call, the fact that the futures price has not reached the level which triggers a margin call implies that the payoff in (3) must be strictly positive.
The preceding discussion suggests that the cash flows generated by a long futures position are similar to those for a down-and-out call option with an exercise price of
and a knockout boundary of
The exercise price in (4) implies that the long futures position will have a positive payoff so long as any loss is less than the initial margin deposit. In other words, depositing initial margin of M dollars implicitly creates an in-the-money call option with an exercise price of M F −
0
. If the futures price reaches the knockout boundary given by (5), we assume that the futures exchange automatically cancels the option by executing an offsetting trade to close out the futures position.
Regardless of whether the position is closed out at the discretion of the trader or the futures exchange, the payoff to a long futures position on any day t prior to the delivery date is equal to
If the futures price hits the knockout boundary and the long position is closed out by the exchange, equation (6) represents the stochastic rebate on the implicit option. Otherwise, equation (6) indication of the quantity of oil that will be delivered during the following month.
The spot month assessment, denoted by S, alters both the exercise price and the knockout boundary for the down-and-out call option. Since the assessment increases the total amount of margin that must be deposited over the life of the contract from M to M + S, the exercise price and the knockout boundary become ( )
) and ( )( ) ) whenever an assessment of S per barrel must be deposited as additional margin
Short Positions
A trader taking a short position in the futures market is required to deposit the same amount of initial margin as a trader with a long position. Given that long and short futures positions must also meet the same maintenance margin requirement, a trader with a short futures position will receive a margin call if the futures price rises to
As is the case for long futures positions, an open short position will be closed out by the futures exchange if additional margin is not deposited.
The option to default places a trader with a short futures position in a situation similar to that for a trader in a long position. However, since a short position profits from a decline in the futures price, the payoff is equivalent to that for an up-and-out put option. The exercise price and knockout boundary for this up-and-out put option are given respectively by
and
Similarly, the imposition of the spot month assessment changes the exercise price and the knockout boundary for the up-and-out put option to, ( )
) and
Given the put-like nature of a short futures position, the payoff following either a rebate from cancellation of the contract or execution of an offsetting long position is given by
Note that while NYMEX has historically required the same initial margins for long and short positions, our framework imposes no a priori restriction that the initial margin requirements for long and short positions must be equal. In fact, our empirical analysis of the margin requirements for crude oil futures identifies several instances where differential margin requirements for long and short positions may have been appropriate. While convenience or other institutional constraints may dictate that small differentials in required margins be overlooked, our model provides a benchmark for the appropriate differential.
Option to Default
The potential losses from default can be valued using a minor variation of our options-based approach. Assuming that traders automatically default on losses in excess of the initial margin requirement, the futures clearinghouse absorbs a loss equal to
when a trader defaults on a long position. Therefore, the expected cost of default can be valued as a down-and-in put option having a strike price given by (4) and a knock-in boundary given by (5). The losses from defaults on short positions can be valued similarly, with an expected cost equal to the value of an up-and-in call option having a strike price given by (8) and a knock-in price given by (9).
The expected cost of default is attributable to the resettlement of futures contracts at discrete intervals, usually at the close of each day's trading. If the futures exchange were able to continuously monitor traders' positions, a "knock-in" could occur as soon as the futures price hit the maintenance margin barrier, preventing any losses from default. Thus, the option to default would have no value if maintenance margins could be monitored continuously. With discrete monitoring, the delay in resettlement following penetration of the knock-in barrier may permit the futures price to fall below the strike price, triggering a potential default.
Evaluating Margin Adequacy
One of the most important functions in the day to day operation of a futures exchange is the determination of appropriate margin requirements. The current standard for setting margins in futures markets is the Statistical Portfolio Analysis of Risk (SPAN) system (see Kupiec and White (1995) ), which uses simulation analysis of the impact of large intra-day changes in futures prices to estimate the margins necessary to protect the solvency of the futures exchange. The SPAN system unconditionally allows the impact of a wide range of prices and volatility levels to be examined.
However, since the range of possible futures prices is conditional on the volatility underlying the futures market, the SPAN system may have a tendency to overstate the margin that is necessary for the futures exchange to operate in a prudent manner.
The option-like nature of the payoffs from margined futures positions suggests two alternative standards for prudential margin requirements. The first is based on the fact that the cash flows from a futures position are equivalent to those from an "out" option with a price equal to the initial margin requirement. If the initial margin requirement is less than the value of this option, a futures position has a positive net present value for the traders who are most likely to default. Setting the initial margin requirement equal to the value of the payoffs from the futures position can ameliorate this adverse selection problem. So long as a trader's initial margin deposit equals the value of the implicit option, a futures contract has a zero net present value. Consequently, the application of a zero net present value standard for margin adequacy eliminates the ex ante incentive to default.
Our options-based framework also provides a related, but more restrictive, standard for margin adequacy. As noted previously, if the losses on a futures position exceed the initial margin requirement, a trader may choose to default. Given the premise that margins should be set as if traders automatically default on any losses in excess of the initial margin requirement, the expected cost of the default can be determined as discussed in Section 2.3. This expected cost could be reduced to zero by setting the initial margin requirements at a level which is sufficiently high. As is the case with the out-option approach to setting margin requirements, this approach also permits differential margin requirements to be imposed on long and short futures positions.
Our characterization of margined futures positions as barrier options implicitly assumes that traders default on losses in excess of the initial margin requirement. Since traders are personally liable for all losses, this overstates the conditional probability of a default. However, a less restrictive assumption would cause margined futures positions to have a positive net present value for those traders most likely to default. Thus, although our assumption causes our estimates of margin requirements to be higher than those required to prevent defaults by creditworthy traders, increases in the incidence of default due to adverse selection of traders would increase the losses that must be absorbed by the futures clearinghouse, leading to the imposition of additional fees.
The Dynamics of the Crude Oil Futures Market
The initial margins required to assure that traders are able to cover potential losses depend critically on the volatility of the futures market. The causal impact of volatility on margin requirements is evidenced by the adjustments in required margins that occur following significant changes in the volatility of the futures market. Therefore, it is desirable to explicitly account for the stochastic properties of futures market volatility in determining initial margins. Since there is no closed-form solution for the value of a barrier option when volatility is stochastic, the adaptation of our approach to incorporate stochastic volatility requires a numerical valuation approach. This
Section describes both the dynamics of the futures market and the numerical procedures used to implement our options-based approach to setting initial margin requirements.
Assume that the dynamics of the futures price are given by
where µ and υ are respectively the instantaneous mean and variance of the futures price and ( ) z t 1 is a standard Wiener process. The instantaneous variance of the futures price is assumed to evolve stochastically according to the mean-reverting diffusion process
where θ determines the speed at which the instantaneous variance reverts to its long-run mean of β and
is a standard Wiener process such that the instantaneous correlation between increments in ( )
The standard techniques for risk-neutral pricing cannot be used when volatility is stochastic.
Since a perfect hedge for the risk associated with the changing volatility of the underlying asset does not exist, the value of a margined futures position depends on the market price of volatility risk.
Given that the cost of carrying a futures position is zero, the partial differential equation that must be satisfied by the value of a margined futures position is
, (13) where φ is the market price of volatility risk.
The solution to (13) is a function of the spot volatility and the five parameters that define the bivariate system of stochastic differential equations specified by (11) and (12). However, because the manner in which θ, β, and φ enter equation (13) does not permit these parameters to be uniquely identified, we solve the following "risk-neutralized" partial differential equation
This specification for the price of a contingent claim implies (see Heston (1993) ) that the instantaneous variance of the futures price follows the "risk-neutralized" square root diffusion
where θ * is equal to θ φ + and
Given an initial margin requirement of M, the value of a long futures position can be determined by solving (14) numerically subject to a sequence of boundary conditions imposed at the grid points representing the close of each day's trading. 6 7 The terminal condition at the expiration of the futures contract is given by (6), with an exercise price defined by (4') as a function 6 The computation of a numerical solution to equation (14) is complicated by the fact that the partial differential equation includes a mixed partial derivative. For partial differential equations having mixed derivatives, Gourlay and McKee (1977) show that the `line hopscotch' approach developed in Gourlay (1970) provides more accurate solutions than do techniques such as 'ordered odd-even' hopscotch, alternating direction implicit, and local one dimensional methods. This technique has previously been used by Wiggins (1987) , Kuwahara and Marsh (1992) , and Day and Lewis (1997) to price options on financial instruments when volatility is stochastic. The partial differential equation is solved by transforming the variables so that the price of an option is a function of the natural logarithms of the futures price (ln F ) and the spot volatility ( ln υ ).
7 Each trading day is divided into 31 time steps.
of both the initial margin requirement and the spot month assessment. Prior to expiration, equation (6) is imposed whenever the futures price is below the knockout barrier at a time step that represents the end of a trading session. The exercise prices and knockout barriers used to compute these boundary values are defined respectively by (4) and (5) prior to the spot month assessment and by (4') and (5') during the final week of trading. 8 The valuation of a short futures position is similar, with boundary conditions given by (10), and strike prices and knockout barriers defined respectively by (8) and (9) prior to the spot month assessment and by (8') and (9') afterwards.
Since the prices of other contingent claims such as exchange traded options must also satisfy the partial differential equation given by (14), a time series of prices for one of these claims can be used to infer the parameters of the risk-neutral diffusion given by (15). Consequently, the prices of call options on crude oil futures contracts can be used to estimate both the parameters of the riskneutral diffusion and the short-run (or spot) volatility of the futures market. Given these estimates, equation (14) and the boundary conditions given in Section 2 can be used to determine the initial margin requirements that would have been adequate under the standards developed in Section 3.
Margin Adequacy in the Crude Oil Futures Market
We evaluate the performance of our model using data for the crude oil futures contract traded on the New York Mercantile Exchange. This contract is of particular interest due to unprecedented volatility of the crude oil futures market following the invasion of Kuwait by Iraq.
The dramatic changes in market conditions that occurred during this period required that the NYMEX make frequent adjustments in initial margin requirements. Given the observed variation in market conditions, this sample provides the basis for an interesting comparison between the 8 The spot month assessment is modeled as the exercise of an option to maintain the futures position by depositing additional margin of S per barrel. For example, if the value of a long futures position with strike price and knockout barrier given respectively by (4') and (5') is less than S, the value of the futures position is set to zero on the date of the spot month assessment.
initial margins set by the NYMEX margin steering committee and the margins that would have been required by our options-based approach to assessing margin adequacy.
Data
The data consist of the daily closing prices, volume and open interest for call options on crude oil futures and the underlying futures contracts beginning with start of trading in the options on November 14, 1986 and running through March 18, 1991. In addition, the New York Mercantile
Exchange supplied the dates and amounts for all changes in margin requirements that occurred during the sample period. The sample includes thirty changes in initial margin requirements, nineteen of which occurred prior to the invasion of Kuwait by Iraq on August 1 of 1990.
Parameter Estimates
The parameters of the stochastic volatility model and the instantaneous volatility of the crude oil futures market are estimated in Day and Lewis (1997) using Hansen's (1982) Generalized
Method of Moments (GMM). Their implementation of this procedure is similar to the estimation of an implied volatility using the Black-Scholes model. However, the assumption that volatility is stochastic implies that the price of a call option is a nonlinear function of the spot volatility, υ, and the parameters of the risk-neutral diffusion for volatility, * θ , β * , ζ, and ρ.
The parameter estimates for equation (15) are where the t-statistics shown in parenthesis are computed using heteroscedasticity consistent standard errors. The estimate for the correlation between changes in volatility and changes in the futures price is equal to -0.157, but is not statistically significant.
Futures Prices, Volatility, and Margin Requirements
The probability that a given amount of initial margin will be sufficient to cover potential losses may change over time with the level of futures prices and the underlying volatility of the market.
Thus, the margin committee for the futures exchange must dynamically adjust margin requirements to reflect these changes in market conditions. Since our options-based procedure for setting margin requirements is sensitive to both the level and volatility of futures prices, this approach provides a useful benchmark for determining the appropriate changes in margin requirements. is attributable to the discrete increments that we use to iteratively solve for initial margin requirements. Figure 3 shows that the required margins for short futures positions increase with volatility up to a critical level and then begin to decline. Since the payoff on a short position is bounded above by the futures price, increases in volatility have no further impact on the expected payoff from the option beyond this critical level. At this point, the value of the short futures position begins to decrease, since increases in volatility increase the probability that the short position will be knocked-out prior to expiration, with no compensating increase in upside potential.
Comparison of Figures 2 and 3 demonstrates that the margin requirements for long positions are not, in general, equal to corresponding margin requirements for short positions.
Summary Statistics
Summary statistics describing the price, volume, and open interest for the near and next-near to delivery futures contracts are presented in Table 1 . In addition, we report summary information for margin requirements and futures market volatility. Since our sample includes the highly volatile period following the invasion of Kuwait, we report summary statistics for both the pre-and postinvasion periods.
The We summarize differences in volatility during the pre-and post-invasion periods by converting the estimated spot volatility for each day in our sample to an expected average volatility over the time until the close of trading in that delivery month. 10 Since the expected average volatility is the 10 Ball and Roma (1992) show that the expected average volatility over τ periods is computed as: 
Options-Based Margin Requirements
The initial margins required by the zero NPV standard must be estimated using an iterative approach. Taking the sequence of spot month assessments imposed by NYMEX as a given, each increases, the weight on the current spot volatility decreases, reflecting the tendency for the spot volatility to revert to its long-run mean of β.
iteration starts with a trial initial margin of $500 per contract. The futures price, the estimated spot volatility, and the parameter estimates in (16) are then used to solve equation (14) for the value of a margined futures position. 11 If the value of the position exceeds the initial margin requirement, the trial initial margin is increased and the position is revalued. 12 This process is repeated until the value of the futures position converges to the initial margin requirement. 13 A similar approach is used to estimate margin requirements for the zero default standard, iteratively increasing initial margins until expected losses from default equal zero. The estimated margin requirements for each of these standards are then compared with actual NYMEX margin requirements.
Previous research by Boyle and Lau (1994) , Ritchken (1995) , Cheuk and Vorst (1996) and Lyuu (1998)) has documented poor convergence properties and biases for binomial and trinomial approaches to pricing barrier options. Since finite difference methods are similar in some respects to a trinomial model, our estimates of initial margin requirements may be subject to similar biases.
These problems may be further exacerbated by the inclusion of futures market volatility as a second state variable. To examine the impact of biases in the finite difference method, we compare our numerical estimates with estimated margins computed using Monte Carlo simulation. This evidence, which is reported in the Appendix, shows that finite difference and Monte Carlo simulation methods provide similar estimates of initial margin requirements. Therefore, for expositional simplicity, we discuss only the results based on finite difference solutions.
11 Large well-capitalized traders often earn money market interest rates on all or part of their margin deposits. However, since the zero NPV standard is intended to model the margins necessary to prevent under-capitalized traders from taking excessive speculative positions, we assume that traders do not earn interest on margin balances. When traders earn interest on 100 percent of the balances in their margin accounts, the margin requirements for the zero NPV standard converge to those required under the zero default standard. 12 Initial margin requirements are increased by $0.25 per barrel ($250 per contract) for initial margins below $2000 per contract. For margin requirements in excess of $2000 per contract, we increment the initial margin requirement by $0.50 per barrel ($500 per contract). These increments are consistent with the minimum increments that have been used by NYMEX to adjust initial margin requirements for the crude oil futures contract. 13 The tolerance for convergence is $0.01 per barrel, which represents a maximum deviation of $10 per contract.
The Zero NPV Standard for Margin Adequacy
The differences between the margin requirements set by the NYMEX and the estimated margin requirements under the zero net present value standard are summarized in Table 2 . The results show that during the sample period the margins set by NYMEX were systematically greater than the margins required by the zero NPV standard. For example, for long positions in the near and next-term futures contracts, the average differences between NYMEX margin requirements and the margins required by the zero NPV standard were respectively $2.06 and $0.86 per barrel. Similarly, for short positions in the near and next-term futures contract, the average differences between NYMEX margin requirements and the zero NPV standard were respectively $2.02 and $0.82 per barrel. The excess margin required by NYMEX on near-term futures contracts appears to be attributable primarily to the imposition of the first spot month assessment, which varied between $1.00 and $5.00 per barrel during the sample period. Although the margins required by NYMEX on the next-term futures contract are greater than the zero NPV margins, this difference does not appear to be excessive given that a typical adjustment to the initial margin requirement is on the order of $0.50 per barrel ($500 per contract). Table 2 reveals some interesting differences in the pre-and post-invasion results. During the pre-invasion period we find that NYMEX margin requirements were always in excess of the margins required by the zero NPV standard. However, during the post-invasion period we find 11 instances where the initial margin requirements by NYMEX are less than the zero NPV standard for long positions in the next-term contract, with an average shortfall of $0.52 per barrel. Shortfalls in NYMEX margin requirements occurred more frequently for short futures positions, falling below the zero NPV standard for the near and next-term contracts on 10 and 46 occasions, respectively. The shortfalls in the initial margin requirements for short positions in the next-term contract were most serious, with an average shortfall of $1.79 per barrel.
Our finding that NYMEX margin requirements were inadequate during portions of the postinvasion period must be interpreted with caution. Although the margin steering committee may change margin requirements at any point during a trading session, in practice margins are adjusted only after it is clear that a change in market conditions has occurred. When market conditions are changing rapidly, as was the case during the post-invasion period, it is not surprising to find instances where NYMEX margin requirements were out of sync with model estimates based on futures prices and volatility at the close of the market. In spite of the shortfalls in required margins that we have identified, the average differences between the initial margins set by NYMEX and those required under the zero NPV standard were greater during post-invasion period than during the pre-invasion period. While these differences between NYMEX margins and our zero NPV standard are attributable in part to the lag with which NYMEX reduced margin requirements as the volatility of the futures market declined during January and February of 1991, the results are consistent with the tendency for NYMEX to set initial margin requirements in excess of the minimums required under the zero NPV standard during the pre-invasion period.
As noted earlier, the standards for margin adequacy that we propose permit the initial margins required for long and short positions to differ. Table 2 
The Zero Default Value Standard for Margin Adequacy
A comparison between NYMEX margin requirements and the initial margins required under the zero default value standard is presented in Table 3 . These results are similar to those presented in Section 6.1 in that NYMEX margin requirements are consistently in excess of the margins required under the zero default standard. However, the average differences between NYMEX margin requirements and the required margins under the zero default standard are somewhat less than those reported in Table 2 for zero NPV standard. For example, the average differences between NYMEX margins and the required zero default margins for long and short positions in the near futures contract are respectively $2.14 and $1.79 per barrel, whereas the corresponding differentials with respect to the zero NPV standard are $2.37 and $2.17 per barrel. This increase in required margins arises because the zero default standard sets margins at a level that reduces the probability of default to zero. By contrast, the zero NPV standard requires only that initial margin requirements equal the value of the payoffs from a margined futures positions.
Since the zero default standard requires higher margins than the zero NPV standard, shortfalls in the adequacy of NYMEX margins occur more frequently when adequacy is measured relative to the zero default standard. During the pre-invasion period NYMEX margins were less than the zero default margins for long positions on 46 days, with an average shortfall of $0.33 per barrel.
Similarly, NYMEX margins for short positions in the next-term contract were less than the zero default margins on 53 days, with an average shortfall of $0.39 per barrel.
As with the zero NPV standard, the shortfall in NYMEX margins relative to the zero default standard is more pronounced during the post-invasion period. 
Regression analysis of the zero NPV margin requirement
Our results show that, while NYMEX margins have at times been less than the zero NPV standard, on average NYMEX has imposed margin requirements in excess of the margins required by both of our options-based standards for adequacy. In this Section, we examine whether the differential between NYMEX margin requirements and those required by our options-based The results presented in Table 4 show that differences between NYMEX margin requirements and the zero NPV standard for long positions are positively related to short-run increases in futures market volatility. Although the coefficient for increases in volatility is not statistically significant, a similar result holds for the regression based on the differential between NYMEX margins and zero NPV margins for short positions in the near contract. By contrast, there is no consistent relation between differential margin requirements and either the growth in volume or open interest. 14 Given that NYMEX margin requirements are on average greater than the corresponding zero NPV margins, the results presented in Table 4 suggest that there is a tendency for NYMEX to respond aggressively to increases in volatility by increasing the "margin of safety" relative to the zero NPV standard as the volatility of the crude oil futures market increases.
Although the changes in volatility have a positive impact on the differential margins required by NYMEX, the interaction coefficient measuring the incremental impact of changes in volatility during the Gulf War is significantly negative. The negative interaction term reflects the fact that as volatility increased dramatically following the invasion of Kuwait, increases in NYMEX margin requirements failed to keep pace with the increases required by the zero NPV standard. Further, as the volatility of the futures market declined during January and February of 1991, NYMEX chose not to reduce margin requirements immediately, waiting instead for the decline in volatility to be confirmed by stabilization of the futures market. The negative interaction coefficients reported in Table 4 are consistent with the results presented in Section 6.1, which show that shortfalls in NYMEX margins relative to the zero NPV standard were confined to the post-invasion period.
Excess Margin Requirements and Futures Market Participation
The results presented in the previous Section show that on average the margin requirements set by NYMEX have been greater than those required by either of our options-based standards for adequacy. As noted previously, the imposition of excessive margin requirements may restrict trading in the futures market, forcing market participants to hold sub-optimal portfolios. Although the optimal portfolios of futures market participants cannot be examined directly, we present We use three alternative measures of market participation to examine the impact of excess margin requirements on futures market liquidity. The first is the total daily trading volume across all delivery months. Although the near and next-term delivery months are the most actively traded contracts, we focus on total trading volume to eliminate the impact of the monthly seasonal that occurs as traders roll out of the near contract and into the next delivery month. We also examine the impact of excess margin requirements on the trading volume generated by both hedgers and speculators. Since hedgers tend to have undiversified positions in the underlying commodity, the volume of trading attributable to hedgers is more likely to be constrained by the inability to post marginable securities as collateral for margined futures positions. Thus, excessive margins should have greater impact on the trading generated by hedgers.
We decompose daily trading volume into hedging and speculative components using daily changes in the total open interest. Whereas total volume reflects trading by both hedgers and speculators, day to day changes open interest primarily reflect the trading volume generated by hedgers. Therefore, we use the absolute value of the daily change in total open interest as a proxy for the daily trading volume of hedgers. 15 Our proxy for speculative trading volume is the difference between total daily trading volume and our estimate of the daily volume of hedging.
We measure the impact of excess margin requirements on trading volume by regressing each measure of trading activity on the respective differences between NYMEX (actual) and zero NPV (model) margin requirements for long positions in the near and the next-term futures contracts.
Since any shortfall in margin requirements implicitly provides speculators with an opportunity to trade an undervalued option, our regression specification includes an interaction term to determine whether speculators take advantage of shortfalls in NYMEX margin requirements by increasing the size of their positions. Further, since trading volume may be affected by the underlying volatility of the futures market, as well as by structural factors that may cause futures market participation to vary over time, we include both volatility and open interest as independent variables in our regression specification. To eliminate monthly seasonals in trading volume, open interest, and futures market volatility, we measure each of these variables as a percentage change relative to the level on the day in the previous month having the same number of days to the end of trading in the near futures contract. The empirical model for trading volume described above is given by,
where TA t = growth in trading volume relative to trading volume for the day in the preceding month having the same number of days until the end of trading in the near futures contract, EM t = the difference between the initial margin requirement set by NYMEX and the margin required under the zero NPV standard for margin adequacy, I E = an interaction variable that equals one if there is a shortfall in NYMEX margin requirements relative to the zero NPV standard and zero otherwise, The estimated regression coefficients are reported in Table 5 . Due to the dramatic increase in volatility following the invasion of Kuwait, we estimate equation (17) The option to default on a futures position implies that initial margin requirements and the current futures price define the strike price and knockout boundary for down-and-out calls and upand-out puts that provide the same payoffs as a long and short futures positions. Based on this equivalence, we argue that initial margins are adequate only if the required margin equals the ex ante value of the option-like payoff from the futures position. In contrast to the current practice of setting uniform margin requirements for long and short futures positions, our approach to setting initial margin requirements is sufficiently flexible to permit the futures clearinghouse to set differential margin requirements for long and short futures positions.
Our analysis of the crude oil futures market suggests that the initial margin requirements set by the New York Mercantile Exchange have on average exceeded the required margins under our options-based standards for adequacy. For example, the NYMEX margin requirements for long positions in the current delivery month exceeded the margins required by our zero-NPV standard by an average of $2,370 per contract. During the period prior to the invasion of Kuwait, we find that NYMEX margin requirements were always in excess of the margins required under the zero NPV standard. By contrast, following the invasion of Kuwait, we find that NYMEX margin requirements were at times inadequate, particularly for short futures positions. Although NYMEX margin requirements fell below the zero NPV standard on several occasions during the postinvasion period, we find that on average required margins continued to be in excess of the levels required under our options-based standards for adequacy.
When margin requirements are in excess of the minimum levels necessary to assure adequacy, trading in the futures market may be restricted, forcing market participants to hold sub-optimal portfolios. Our results show that during the pre-invasion period there is a negative relation between excess margin requirements and both the volume of speculative trading and hedging.
Further, we find that the negative relation between excess margins and speculative trading volume continues to hold during the post-invasion period. However, in contrast to the pre-invasion period, we find a positive relation between hedging volume and excess margin requirements. Given the extreme volatility during the post-invasion period, it is likely that the increase in hedging volume is attributable to an increase in the demand to hedge, and that this relation is therefore spurious.
Further, although margin requirements in excess of the zero-NPV standard tend to reduce trading volume, we find that shortfalls in margin requirements do not induce a corresponding increase in trading volume.
Appendix:

Comparison of Finite Difference and Monte Carlo Solutions
To examine the extent of any biases in the finite difference method that we use to estimate barrel during the post-invasion period. Thus, although we find some relatively minor differences in these alternative solutions for our options-based approach, both solution techniques suggest that the minimum required margins are significantly less than the actual margin requirements set by NYMEX. The results for the zero default standard reported in Table A2 are similar.
Figure 1 Payoffs to a Long Position along Different Futures Price Paths
The figure below illustrates the payoffs to a long position in a margined futures contract along three different price paths. Price path (A) illustrates a case where the trader must post maintenance margin at the end of day t. Price path (B) also depicts a case where the drop in the futures price is sufficient to require maintenance margin at the end of day t. For this case, the price drop is sufficiently large that the trader will default on the open position rather than restore the equity in the margin account to the initial margin level. Price path (C) shows a scenario where the price drops below the maintenance margin level during day t+1 but recovers sufficiently so that no margin call is made at the end of the day.
Margin call occurs if futures price falls below this level at close of day.
Trader's equity falls below zero at this point.
Figure 2 Margin Requirements for Long Positions in Crude Oil Futures Contracts
The figure below plots the margin requirements that are necessary to make a long position in the near futures contract a zero net present value investment. Margin requirements were determined for standard deviations ranging from 5 percent to 200 percent (in 5 percent increments) by solving equation (14) numerically using the parameter estimates reported in Section 5.2, subject to the exercise price and knock-out boundary given by (8) and (9). The reported margins reflect futures positions with 25 trading days to the expiration in crude oil futures contracts with prices of $16, $24 and $32 per barrel. All reported margins reflect a single spot month assessment of $2 per barrel, occurring five business days prior to expiration. 
Figure 3 Margin Requirements for Short Positions in Crude Oil Futures Contracts
The figure below plots the margin requirements that are necessary to make a short position in the near futures contract a zero net present value investment. Margin requirements were determined for standard deviations ranging from 5 percent to 200 percent (in 5 percent increments) by solving equation (14) numerically using the parameter estimates reported in Section 5.2, subject to the exercise price and knock-out boundary given by (8') and (9'). The reported margins reflect futures positions with 25 trading days to the expiration in crude oil futures contracts with prices of $16, $24 and $32 per barrel. All reported margins reflect a single spot month assessment of $2 per barrel, occurring five business days prior to expiration. Table 2 Average Differences between Actual Margins and Zero NPV Margin Requirements
The average differences between the margin requirements on crude oil futures contracts set by the New York Mercantile Exchange and the margins that would have been adequate to cause long and short positions to have zero net present value using our option based approach to setting margin requirements are reported below. The average differences are reported for both long and short positions in the nearest to delivery futures contract and the next to delivery futures contract. In addition to the results for the complete sample period, we also report results for the period prior to the invasion Kuwait by Iraq, from November 14, 1986 through July 31, 1990, and the period following the invasion, from Table 3 Average Differences between Actual Margins and Zero Default Option Margin Requirements
The average differences between the margin requirements on crude oil futures contracts set by the New York Mercantile Exchange and the margins that would have been adequate to cause long and short positions to have zero default option value using our option based approach to setting margin requirements are reported below. The average differences are reported for both long and short positions in the nearest to delivery futures contract and the next to delivery futures contract. In addition to the results for the complete sample period, we also report results for the period prior to the invasion Kuwait by Iraq, from November 14, 1986 through July 31, 1990, and the period following the invasion, from Table 4 Regression Analysis of Differences between NYMEX Margin Requirements and Zero NPV Requirements
The regression results reported below represent an exploratory regression analysis of the relation between NYMEX margin requirements and the margins required under the zero NPV standard for adequacy. The dependent variable used in this analysis is the difference between the initial margin requirements set by NYMEX and the corresponding zero NPV margin requirements for long and short positions in the near and next near futures contracts. The independent variables include changes in volatility, trading volume, and open interest, measured in terms of percentage changes relative to the level for the day in the previous month having the same number of days until the end of trading in the near futures contract. An interaction term is included to control for the differential impact of changes in volatility on the margin requirements imposed by NYMEX during the Gulf War. Coefficient estimates are presented in the first row; t-statistics are reported directly below the coefficient estimate. 
Comparison of Numerical and Monte Carlo Approaches to Margin Adequacy
The initial margin requirements for long positions in the near futures contract are reported below. We report the minimum adequate margin requirements based on the zero net present value standard for initial margin requirements computed using both the numerical hopscotch approach outlined in the paper and a monte carlo solution technique based on 5,000 replications of the sample paths for the underlying futures prices and volatility of the crude oil futures market described by equations (11) Table A2 Comparison of Numerical and Monte Carlo Approaches to Margin Adequacy
The initial margin requirements for long positions in the near futures contract are reported below. We report the minimum adequate margin requirements based on the zero default value standard for initial margin requirements computed using both the numerical hopscotch approach outlined in the paper and a monte carlo solution technique based on 5,000 replications of the sample paths for the underlying futures prices and volatility of the crude oil futures market described by equations (11) and (12 
